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Abstract.  Launching on STS-108 Endeavour in late 2001, the Small Payload Access to Space 
Experiment (SPASE) demonstrates a number of new technologies, efficient ways to conduct a 
nanospacecraft development program, and how to take such a spacecraft through the Shuttle 
Hitchhiker safety and integration process.  This paper describes the essential “lessons learned” in 
each of these areas.  Commercial solar panels, batteries, imagers, photocells, integrated circuits, 
and manufacturing techniques are used throughout the vehicle, bringing the low cost and high 
manufacturing reliability of these products into the space realm.  Core personnel carried the 
program from conception through proposal, requirements definition, design, development, 
integration, test, and delivery, making the whole program significantly more efficient.  Shuttle 
safety issues were addressed from the beginning and continually throughout the program, as part 
of (not added to) the development effort.  The information learned throughout this process, and 
the new doors opened by this demonstration – such as the first use of Lithium-Ion batteries in a 
Shuttle payload – help make space utilization more efficient, more affordable, and easier for 
future missions.  AeroAstro’s Bitsy nanospacecraft kernel will be flight-proven by the SPASE 
mission. 
 
 
Introduction 
The SPASE program began in Spring 1998 
with a partnership between AeroAstro and 
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) 
Science Directorate (SD).  MSFC SD wanted 
an inexpensive way to perform free-flying 
microgravity crystal growth experiments; 
AeroAstro wanted to demonstrate its Bitsy 
nanospacecraft kernel.   
 
The SPASE mission was proposed in 
September 1998 to the X-34 Future-X 
program as a way to reduce the cost of access 
to space, by developing and demonstrating a 
vehicle that could perform a useful science / 
technology mission for under $2M including 
launch.  The program was awarded in 
December of that same year.  Contract 
negotiations began in mid to late 1999, and the 
contract was signed in January 2000. 
 
Technical development of AeroAstro’s 
portion of the satellite (Bitsy – providing 
power management, voltage regulation, 
commanding and telemetry, data storage, 
batteries, and radios) and SD’s portion (the 
Microgravity Crystal Growth Demonstration, 
or MCGD, containing the crystal growth cell, 
illumination, camera, and interface 
electronics) began at that point, along with 
development of the shared components (solar 
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panels, specified by AeroAstro but mounted to 
MCGD, and passive magnetic attitude control 
system, with parts mounted in both units).   
 
Flight unit integration lasted from late Winter 
through late Spring of 2001, and at time of 
this paper’s writing, the spacecraft is in 
environmental test, performing well after mass 
properties, vibration, and all five cycles of 
thermal/vacuum testing.  Integration with the 
Shuttle Hitchhiker is expected on July 30, 
2001.  This timeline itself demonstrates one 
important lesson: proposal and contracting 
took approximately the same amount of time 
(~18 months) as the technical program. 
 
While the core SPASE team was small, the 
personnel and organizations involved were 
ultimately extensive.  The primary 
contributors to the program included: 
• MSFC Space Transportation Directorate, 
providing funding and program 
management for all aspects of the program 
except the MCGD 
• MSFC Science Directorate, providing the 
MCGD payload and science analysis 
• MSFC Engineering Directorate, providing 
test facilities and support personnel 
• AeroAstro, the prime contractor for the 
spacecraft, providing the Bitsy spacecraft 
kernel and ultimately responsible for the 
mission 
• University of Alabama at Huntsville, 
providing the ground station facility and 
spacecraft operators 
• Payload Systems Incorporated, providing 
Shuttle safety support, and authoring the 
majority of the Shuttle safety package 
• NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC), providing the Hitchhiker ride into 
space and extensive safety support 
• NASA Johnson Space Flight Center (JSC), 
providing final Shuttle safety review and 
particular assistance in battery issues 
• Team Encounter, providing funding for a 
CMOS imager experiment to assist in the 
development of a new star tracker 
• Kyocera Solar Corporation, providing the 
solar panels and the process for creating 
them that has the advantages of 
commercial manufacture with the 
resilience required for space 
 
The spacecraft itself is 56.6 cm tall, 43.2 cm 
in diameter, fitting comfortably inside a 
Hitchhiker can.  It will be ejected by a Pallet 
Ejection System (PES) from a cross-bay 
bridge on STS-108, scheduled for launch on 
November 29, 2001 for a Space Station 
servicing mission.  SPASE will be deployed 
near the end of the Shuttle mission into a 
Station altitude and inclination orbit. 
 
 
Figure 1. SPASE Demonstration Vehicle. 
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The photograph in Figure 1 shows the SPASE 
Demonstration Vehicle flight hardware during 
mass properties testing.  The Shuttle 
Hitchhiker Palette Ejection System interface is 
visible at one end of the spacecraft, as are two 
of the six commercial terrestrial solar panels. 
 
Visible in the following picture (Figure 2) are 
the internal Bitsy electronics.  The radio stack, 
an S-band transmitter/receiver using FM 
uplink and BPSK downlink, is in the left 
corner.  The Lithium-Ion battery pack is in the 
bottom corner, with charging and managing 
electronics visible on top of the battery 
enclosure.  The large electronics board 
spanning the width of the Bitsy box is the 
Bitsy-SX* Power/Command/Telemetry board. 
 
The NASA Marshall Microgravity Crystal 
Growth Demonstration canister is shown in 
Figure 3.  A commercial camera is mounted 
inside of a hexagonal support structure, and is 
focused on a sugar water solution in which a 
crystal will grow on orbit.  The experiment is 
                                                 
* The Bitsy product line has three versions: 1) SX, the 
core electronics providing power, commanding, and 
telemetry functions; 2) DX, the SX with an automotive-
electronics computer; and 3) LX, a product in 
conceptual design that will incorporate recent advances 
in miniaturized technology such as micro momentum 
wheels. 
thermally isolated as much as possible to 
maintain a suitable sample temperature. 
 
This paper will explore “lessons learned” in 
three realms:  
• The Recurrent Lessons, items which 
remain true for all programs but are 
reviewed to highlight their importance 
• Technology Lessons, specific things 
learned about the various technologies 
being demonstrated on this vehicle 
• Shuttle Lessons, focusing on the effort of 
Shuttle safety approval. 
 
Recurrent Lessons 
Integrate Early   
Any two pieces of equipment, however well 
designed and however well-defined the 
interface, will have at least one anomaly when 
they are integrated for the first time.  Often 
and hopefully these issues are small and easily 
resolved, but they will occur, and sometimes 
they will be significant and require nontrivial 
modification to one or both items.  This 
applies to both electrical and mechanical 
interfaces.  Therefore, integrate early to learn 
sooner rather than later what needs to be fixed. 
 
 
Figure 2. Bitsy Internal Electronics. 
 
Figure 3. NASA Marshall MCGD. 
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To integrate early, something in subsystem 
development has to be shortened (assuming 
the product delivery time is fixed).  A 
shortening of the design effort is good if it 
encourages simplification in the design, but 
bad if it induces a rush to production.  A 
shortening of the subsystem test effort is good 
if it focuses those tests on subsystem 
behaviors that cannot be tested once 
integrated, but bad if it produces subsystems 
that “mostly work” and have to be extensively 
modified later. 
 
Simplicity Breeds Robustness   
A single straightforward, easily tested system 
is worth four cross-redundant complex ones.  
It may not be glamorous or exciting to build 
simple systems, but simple systems work, and 
in the space industry the device must work.   
 
On the SPASE battery system, we inherited a 
design which used a microcontroller to 
program the charger.  There is a version of the 
charger IC which does not require a 
microcontroller, but the battery pack vendor 
chose features over simplicity, and used the 
microcontroller.  We have had no end of 
problems with this design.   
 
Conversely, the communications system is a 
bytewise UART-based protocol, with no 
phase-locked-loop clock recovery in the 
receiver, no packetization of the downlink 
data, and a single 5-byte command structure 
that controls all spacecraft functions.  This 
reduces our bandwidth efficiency, increases 
our bit error rate, and forces the ground station 
software to piece together the bits of an 
interrupted downlink, but it works, and works 
well.  In space, “optimal” should have a very 
clear meaning: one optimizes for robustness, 
and let “performance” (a term which certainly 
only has meaning when the device works) fall 
where it may. 
 
Schedule Conservatively   
It is alright to be pleasantly surprised when 
things go well and faster than anticipated.  It is 
not alright to have things go poorly and then 
run out of time to correct them.  There are 
clear warning signs that a program is walking 
down the wrong path.   
 
The first warning sign is a knowledge at the 
beginning of the program that getting to the 
end in time is going to be difficult – at the 
beginning, one should think that there is just a 
little too much time.  The perception of “just a 
little too much time” at the beginning 
generally corresponds to an accurate 
prediction of the actual time something will 
take.  Another warning sign is the 
presumption that something (usually a test) is 
going to go well.  This has two problems: one, 
it encourages too little time to be scheduled 
for the test; and two, it discourages a sense of 
urgency to perform that test, and delays it.   
 
On SPASE we were concerned that the digital 
electronics and the power system would be 
difficult to integrate.  We were pleasantly 
surprised at how easy it was.  We were 
however not concerned about the system’s 
performance at temperature, since we were 
expecting a quite benign temperature regime 
of –7 to +35oC.  As a result we did not take 
early opportunities to temperature-cycle the 
electronics, and when we did get to it, had a 
number of issues to address, and no time to do 
so.  The total number of issues we 
encountered in the digital/power integration 
far exceeded the four problems we had at 
temperature; but the latter problems had far 
greater impact because we did not schedule 
time to deal with them. 
 
A final note on scheduling is the fairly 
obvious, but still critically important, 
statement: do not add new hardware near the 
end of the program.  As with the timing 
perception above, the sense that “We could 
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have done more” generally reflects that the 
program has done exactly the right amount.  
Resist the urge to trade current schedule 
advantage for a new and untested feature. 
Test to Break Things, Not Show They Work  
This is an overstatement but a valuable one.  
Thorough testing – by which is meant many 
hours of using a system in the manner in 
which it will be used operationally – is critical 
for a device that is going to spend its 
operational life far out of reach of repairing 
hands.  “Thorough”, however, is a nebulous 
word easily twisted to mean “I tried each thing 
once and it worked”.  The testing attitude is 
critically important, and for design testing – 
not workmanship – the attitude should be 
“What can I do to make this device 
misbehave?”  Each power line may have 
worked when it was turned on.  But what if 
they were all turned on at once?  The current 
limit may work, turning a line off when it 
pulls too many amps.  But what if the device 
pulled the maximum number of amps, 
continuously, not crossing the limit?  Can the 
system sustain that?  Are the analog telemetry 
signals affected?  How about the combination: 
all the power lines turning on at once, all of 
them pulling the maximum amount of power.  
Will the system support that?  It may be 
alright if it does not.  But the very act of trying 
it will teach you more about your system, 
lessons you want to learn on the ground. 
 
There is another approach to testing which 
says to characterize every parameter of a 
system, quantitatively.  This is certainly 
informative but it does not encourage the 
useful attitude above.  It often inspires a false 
confidence because the parameters you check 
are already the ones you designed for; the 
“What can I do to break it?” attitude 
encourages thinking about aspects of the 
system not directly related to specific 
performance parameters. 
 
Have a Small, Highly Communicative Team 
with a Leader   
It is a highly desired but never attained goal to 
have all interfaces, and performance 
characteristics, and system architectures 
defined completely at the beginning of a 
program, then letting the designers go off and 
build their well-specified systems.  The fact of 
any development is that there are new things 
learned on a daily basis which affect, change, 
or obviate yesterday’s specification.  This is 
not to be avoided; it is to be understood and 
incorporated into the development flow.  Any 
changes should be communicated with the 
team, not formally (which can discourage 
communication), but by simply contacting the 
people involved and discussing the change 
with them.  In order to make sure that a 
change made in one realm does not conflict 
with a change made in another, the team 
should have a leader who is always kept 
informed of these developments.  This only 
works if the team is small and interactive 
enough to allow such spontaneous 
communication without grinding the program 
to a halt or overwhelming the leader with 
information. 
 
Technology Lessons 
Commercial Solar Panels Are Good   
Space solar panels have three issues which 
distinguish them from terrestrial solar panels: 
one, they see severe thermal shock at orbit 
dawn / orbit dusk, stressing solder connections 
and material bonding; two, they encounter 
more ultraviolet and ionic radiation; and three, 
they must survive launch stresses*.  As a 
result, space solar panels are traditionally 
handmade, with careful attention paid to 
                                                 
* There is an issue of performance – cells optimized for 
higher wavelengths, and the increasing use of 
multijunction cells in spacecraft – but that is a 
distinction in degree rather than in kind; terrestrial 
panel manufacturers care about performance too. 
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interconnect strain relief, and with individual 
glass panes placed over each cell because 
glass is resilient to ultraviolet radiation and 
helps block ions.  The result is a labor-
intensive, costly process that cannot take 
advantage of automated manufacturing 
techniques or quantity testing. 
 
Kyocera Solar Corporation expressed 
confidence that they could manufacture panels 
using a variant of their usual process that 
would satisfy the three requirements for space 
use, while still taking advantage of the highly 
refined and reliable automated manufacturing 
process they use for manufacturing 
commercial units.  They worked extensively 
with AeroAstro to develop a series of 
prototype panels, and with the cooperation of 
NASA Marshall under a Space Act 
Agreement, the panels were tested and the 
process refined to produce exactly what 
Kyocera promised.  Panels built under this 
refined process are now set to fly on SPASE, 
and should answer the one remaining 
question, of performance in a LEO radiation 
environment. 
 
The lessons learned here are both 
programmatic and technical. 
Programmatically, having a vendor like 
Kyocera who is interested and excited about 
the project makes enormous difference both in 
the ease of the interaction and in the quality of 
the product delivered.  Vendors whom we had 
to convince to work with us turned out 
immeasurably worse.  Technically, the panels 
are superlatively easy to work with, being 
covered in Tefzel® (a durable and protective 
Teflon laminate) instead of glass, and show a 
very respectable 12-14% efficiency.  This is 
one of the most exciting technologies being 
demonstrated on SPASE. 
 
Lithium-Ion Batteries Are Good   
This is the other singular technology that is 
most notable on SPASE.  To explore the 
lessons learned, a distinction must first be 
made: the battery cells, manufactured by 
vendors such as Maxell or SAFT or Sony or a 
host of others, are robust, reliable, safe, and 
inspire great confidence.  The battery 
electronics, designed in-house or delivered by 
a vendor, can be finicky and must handle the 
high power flowing through them in any 
configuration.  The electronics must be able to 
switch directly from high-current charge to 
high-current discharge and back.  More 
strongly, the electronics must be more than 
able to handle such extreme conditions: they 
must be overdesigned, able to handle 
conditions far more extreme than the ones 
actually expected. 
 
Lithium-Ion battery circuits, to assuage safety 
concerns (which are actually now handled 
within the cell anyway), traditionally 
incorporate a pack manager in addition to a 
charger.  This manager disables charge, or 
discharge, or both, if it detects a problematic 
situation in the battery cells: overvoltage, 
undervoltage, overcurrent, overtemperature, 
undertemperature, or cell mismatch.  The 
difficulty is that if it misinterprets any of these 
conditions as existing when it does not, it can 
become caught in an unrecoverable mode, 
with the battery turned off and no way to get it 
back.  AeroAstro’s observation is that a cell 
management circuit does not add to the safety 
features already present in modern Lithium-
Ion cells, and decreases overall pack 
reliability. 
 
To reiterate the earlier statement, the Lithium-
Ion cells themselves are excellent, their 
manufacturing process refined through 
billions of cellular telephones and laptop 
computers and camcorders and the like.  The 
future use of Lithium-Ion in spacecraft, with 
energy densities well over 100 Watt-hours per 
kilogram, is a given, and SPASE is a 
pathfinder for this development in the 
industry. 
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Industrial Electronics Are Good  
The aerospace industry lives with the legacy 
of a time when integrated circuits were in their 
infancy and careful parts testing and selection, 
including, usually, custom part development, 
was essential.  This has long since become 
untrue but the legacy lives on.  Modern 
industrial-grade electronics are practically 
indestructible, and the fact of mass production 
means that their quality far exceeds any 
custom-built device.  In an effort to 
understand why parts remains such a concern 
in space industry circles, AeroAstro began 
investigating reports of part failures, and 
found without exception that each case 
investigated was one where the part was 
misapplied or the systemic behavior 
misunderstood; that is to say, the fault was 
with the circuit design, not the circuit 
components. In fact, during Bitsy prototyping, 
electronic components were often subjected to 
conditions far outside their stated tolerances, 
as is usual during debugging; yet almost every 
time, even these abused parts kept working. 
 
The issue of radiation is often presented as a 
reason why terrestrial electronics are 
inappropriate for space.  This conception 
continues despite the many spacecraft using 
industrial electronics, even in high-radiation 
orbits, without problem.  Certainly there are 
missions and situations which call for 
radiation-hardened or radiation-tolerant parts, 
but the majority of modern missions – in Low-
Earth Orbit for 3 years or less – do not.  It is 
worth noting that humans are less tolerant to 
radiation than any semiconductor by 
approximately one order of magnitude, and 
they have been living in LEO for quite some 
time. 
 
CMOS Imagers Are Promising and Worth 
More Effort  
Team Encounter funded the addition of a 
CMOS camera to the SPASE vehicle as part 
of a star tracker development for their 
extrasolar Encounter spacecraft.  The 
advantages of CMOS imagers over others 
(particularly CCDs) are that CMOS has 
significantly lower power requirements – 
lower voltage, more tolerance to noise, lower 
total power consumption – and an easier 
interface, and especially useful for star 
trackers, they can perform massively parallel 
two-dimensional computations on the imager 
plane: particularly, the imager itself can 
identify all star loci in a single step.  The 
tradeoff is that CMOS is significantly less 
light-sensitive than CCD technology.  The 
advantages of CMOS warrants continued 
development into a useful star tracker, and the 
CMOS camera flying on SPASE will 
characterize the current state of technology in 
this application. 
 
Passive ACS Systems Are Easy to Design, but 
Just as Difficult to Test as Active Ones 
SPASE uses four hysteresis rods and one 
permanent magnet to reduce rotational 
accelerations and help the side-mounted solar 
panels point generally at the Sun.  The 
hysteresis rods are soft-magnetic material 
which resist a change of orientation within a 
magnetic field, and require no power.  The 
permanent magnet is mounted at the top end 
of the spacecraft inside MCGD, and the 
hysteresis rods are at the bottom end on each 
of Bitsy’s four walls, to prevent the former 
from magnetizing the latter.  The design is 
simple, efficient, and performs the required 
function of keeping the crystal growth 
chamber (mounted near the center of gravity 
of the vehicle) in a microgravity acceleration 
environment. 
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The difficulty lay in the characterization of the 
magnet and the rods to ensure they would 
perform the required job.  The forces involved 
are so miniscule that they are easily 
overwhelmed by gravity or the mechanical 
and material characteristics of the test 
apparatus.  The forces (as predicted) are more 
than adequate in space, where the 
contravening forces – gravity gradient, solar 
pressure – are similarly small.  But they are 
“lost in the noise” on the ground, at least for a 
reasonable budget.  SPASE relies on the 
simplicity-into-robustness argument in the 
extreme for the ACS system, as it is simple in 
the extreme.  However, thorough and realistic 
ACS testing remains, for this simple system as 
well as for complex ones, one of the most 
significant difficulties of spacecraft 
manufacture. 
 
Miniaturization Can Make for a Spacecraft 
That Is Both Very Easy and Very Hard to 
Assemble  
For SPASE, the single Bitsy box housed the 
subsystems that required six boxes on 
AeroAstro’s previous spacecraft: power 
management, batteries, command and data 
handling, telemetry and control, radios, and 
payload interface.  And AeroAstro’s previous 
spacecraft themselves had fewer boxes than 
was typical.  This miniaturization pays off not 
only in having fewer units to assemble, but in 
the fact that the result system is quite small 
and easily managed by a single person.  Thus 
disassembly of the spacecraft to get at a 
subsystem took a single person a fraction of 
an hour, instead of a team of people most of a 
day. 
 
The negative consequence of this is that all of 
the radio, and power, and payload, and 
telemetry cabling, that used to be spread out 
across a vehicle the size of an oil drum, is now 
tucked into a space the size of a pie box.  This 
makes both mounting and routing a difficult 
process that generally requires either small 
fingers or a clever tool.  This lesson will 
certainly be applied in AeroAstro’s future 
Bitsy-based spacecraft. 
 
Shuttle Lessons 
Communicate Extensively with Shuttle 
Safety People   
A design decision explained early will have a 
smoother ride through the safety process than 
the same decision explained at the formal 
safety package presentation.  Conversely, 
when choosing between two otherwise equal 
design options, discussing it with the relevant 
Hitchhiker or Shuttle safety person can 
eliminate a great amount of difficulty.  
Selecting separation switches, setting the radio 
transmission power level, placing electrolyte-
absorbent material around the battery cells, 
and any number of other issues were rendered 
easily solved at the design stage instead of 
having to be addressed post-manufacture 
because the matter was raised with the 
Hitchhiker safety team.  There is also the 
significant – arguably more significant – 
factor that by communicating frequently with 
the NASA safety team, a sense of mutual trust 
and understanding is fostered, making the 
formal document approval more 
straightforward because the reviewers are 
already familiar with both the design and the 
designers. 
 
It Is Vital to Know the Opinions of the 
Particular Safety People Involved   
The Shuttle safety process is certainly replete 
with specification documents, and clarification 
documents, and inter-center agreements to 
recognize each other’s documents.  The 
commonly held belief is that these documents 
fully specify the requirements that must be 
met by a Shuttle payload.  The fact, however, 
is that there is a great amount left open to 
interpretation, and it is of course only the 
interpretation of the people approving your 
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safety plan that matters.  For instance, there is 
a limit, expressed in Volts per meter, defining 
how strong a radio transmitter can be before it 
is considered a hazard.  What is not expressed 
is where this limit applies.  At the outer 
envelope of the payload?  At the nearest 
device that can be affected by the 
transmission?  At some nominal distance, such 
as one meter?  Each of these possibilities were 
presented by various Shuttle safety personnel 
at various times.  As above, the important 
thing is to communicate the system design to 
the safety team, and solicit the opinion and 
advice of the individual responsible for 
approving this aspect of your safety plan. 
 
Simple Does Not Equal Easy  
No matter how simple the design, no matter 
how straightforward the approach, you will 
still need to explain it to the safety team just 
as thoroughly, and justify it just as solidly, as 
if it were thoroughly intricate and complex.  
Certainly a simple design is easier to explain 
than a complex one; but the scrutiny will be 
the same on both.  Once again, the key is 
communication with the safety team. 
 
Involve Someone who Already Knows Their 
Way around the System   
AeroAstro hired Payload Systems Inc., who 
has assisted with the integration of a number 
of Shuttle payloads – assisting particularly in 
the safety process – to help take the SPASE 
design and convert it into a safety package 
that would look familiar, understandable, and 
complete to the safety review team.  PSI knew 
or got to know many of the personalities 
involved with the Shuttle safety process, both 
the Goddard Hitchhiker team and the Johnson 
Shuttle team.  This was very valuable both in 
knowing whom to ask when a particular 
question arose, and in determining the best 
way of expressing the safety aspects of the 
SPASE mission in a way acceptable to both 
the Goddard team and the Johnson team.  It is 
important to remember, however, that by 
involving another organization in this process, 
that organization must be kept informed of 
new developments in the spacecraft design, 
both in order to incorporate this information 
into the safety package, and to highlight any 
safety implications of the new design. 
 
Conclusion 
The SPASE mission demonstrates a number 
of exciting new technologies to reduce the 
cost of access to space.  In conducting this 
program, many technological and 
programmatic lessons were learned, which can 
benefit other missions of its type, and will 
benefit AeroAstro’s Bitsy nanospacecraft 
kernel and Bitsy-based spacecraft.  Since the 
idea of Bitsy is to create a kernel of spacecraft 
functions that can be used across a broad 
variety of missions, the benefit of the SPASE 
program is not only in the increased 
experience of the team involved, but in the 
reproducible Bitsy product itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
